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I. IWTBOIWCTIOH
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to do an analysis of Air-
Launched Missile (ALM) maintenance for Sparrow missiles,
and determine if it would be feasible to combine the Depot
and Intermediate level maintenance into a single site. This
may allow the Navy to cut costs or operate more
efficiently. In order to accomplish this, the present three
levels of maintenance, Organizational (0), Intermediate
(I), and Depot (D) level will be reviewed. The type of
maintensuice, how it is costed out and budgeted for will be
traced. Finally, an analysis will be done on the proposal
to combine intermediate level and depot level maintenance
into a single site. Due to the recent defense buildup,
there has been an increasing number of missiles purchased.
As these missiles are issued to the fleet, they will have
to be returned for maintenance. It is anticipated that the
maintenance budget will not increase sufficiently to keep
pace with the maintensunce requirements in future years.
Ways to eliminate overhead, combine workforce, and shorten
turnaround time must be made if the fleet is to maintain an
acceptable level of operational readiness.
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION
To Analyze the maintenance program for Sparrow missiles
within the U.S. Navy. Upon completion of the study,
determine if there are ways to reduce costs without
reducing readiness and compare that to the baseline.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to find problems, one must become familiar
with the way the system operates. To do this, you must
first conduct a review of available instructions and
mainuals. This entails scauining the documents to gain an
understanding of how the system is supposed to operate.
Only then will empirical observations on site make any
sense. Using both the primary and secondary data a
mathematical model can be developed to break down the
problem into its true nature and the causal relationships
that exist.
First, a review of the literature was conducted using
related publications and Maintenance Management Msunuals.
Then, a trip was made to PMTC to conduct interviews and
obtain budget documents and budget summaries. This was
followed by a trip to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
Code 418. Finally, a trip to Weapon Station, Concord, and
Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda, to observe actual missile
maintenance was taiken.
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D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
The scope of this thesis will be to determine how
intermediate level maintenance is performed for a specific
type of ALM. The missile to be used in this study is the
Sparrow III AIM-7E/F/M. No attempt will be made to draw
similar conclusions for missiles other than for the Pacific
Fleet. Nor will any attempt be made to include Foreign
Military Sales projects.
E. LIMITATIONS
This thesis will be unclassified. As such, exact
missile capabilities, numbers, and readiness figures will
not be used.
F. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The assumptions are:
1. That there will be continued growth in missile
inventory.
2. There will be no new breakthroughs in technology.
3. That no new legislation will be passed hindering the
Navy from building new facilities, specifically, a
ban on constructing new buildings due to
environmental impact problems or a change in the
maximum aimount of ordnance that can be located in a
particular location.
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G. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The longest delay in the maintenemce cycle used to be
for Guidance euid Control sections to go from WEPSTA Concord
to Naval Air Depot and return. By developing a rotatable
pool of spares, the critical factor is the amount of
missiles that can be processed by the WEPSTA. The limiting
factors on the processing of missiles are, containers,
people, and the test equipment.
The original goal of this thesis was to show cost
savings by combining intermediate level and depot level
maintenance into a single site located at WEPSTA Concord.
However, the research has pointed out otherwise. It not
possible for intermediate level maintenance to be performed
at Alameda due to explosive limits. It is not practical to
move the present D-level facility to Concord.
A cost figure has been developed to show the amount of
life cycle costs that can be saved for Sparrow missiles by
decreasing maintenance time by a single day.
H. RECOMMENDATIONS
Do not change the present location of the mainteneince
facilities for either depot or intermediate level
activities.
Improve the output of WEPSTA Concord by either
increasing container rework, hiring more people, or
installing a third test set.
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I. CONCLUSIONS
The maintenance of air-launched missiles is a well
conceived program that has few problems other than those
listed in this paper. Maintenance costs can be accurately
predicted by using historical data to determine the amount
of maintenance a missile will need cuid the cost of that
maintenaince. By following the recommendation made in this
study^ total costs will decrease with no loss in readiness.
J. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter Two will give an overview of the maintenance
organization. How the different maintenance levels interact
and the work performed at each level will be examined.
Finally, a description of the building where the
maintenance is conducted and the test equipment used to
perform the testing is discussed.
Chapter Three, Analysis, will show what the limiting
factors are on the missile maintenance pipeline. A method
of determining how to measure the cost of one day of
maintenance on total missile inventory will developed.
In the final chapter, a summary of the information
gathered will be emphasized. How euid why certain
conclusions were reached will be discussed. A list of
recommendations in order of priority will also be included.
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II. BACKqRWMP
The keys to any system are the orgeinizatlons that
support it. First, a breakdown of the organizational
relationships and responsibility will be examined. This
will be followed by what the Sparrow missile is, what
maintenance is performed, and where. A review of the budget
process suid capability of the the test equipment will
finish the section.
A. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible, under
the direction of the Secretary of the Navy for the command
of the operating forces of the Navy. As such, he is
responsible for the utilization of Naval resources and the
operating efficiency of all commands and activities under
his command. The CNO is responsible for establishing the
Asset Readiness Objective (ARO) for each missile for a
particular year. The planning and progreumning of airborne
weapons maintenance workload at shore based maintenance
facilities is predicated on the achievement of the CNO ARO
published yearly in OPNAVINST C4850 series.
2
.
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
NAVAIR is responsible for the acquisition, quality
evaluation suid logistic support of all airborne weapons
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under NAVAIR cognizance. In addition, NAVAIR provides the
technical direction for the manufacture, modification,
repair, overhaul, and material effectiveness of their
airborne weapons. NAVAIR is also responsible for:
o Providing the airborne weapons policy guidance,
o Providing airborne weapons maintenance processing
documents outlining maintenance functions,
organizations and responsibilities,
o Assisting in the development of an effective training
program for military and civilian personnel assigned
maintenance functions,
o Providing airborne weapons maintenance material
allowaunce lists,
o Directing the Maintenance Data Collection System
(MDCS).
o Recommending procedural changes, methods and technical
guidance to effect continuing improvements in the Naval
Airborne Weapons Maintenance Program,
o Providing technical direction and a centralized system
for the control and issue of all technical directives
concerning naval airborne weapons aind associated
material,
o Maintaining inventory management control of major ALM
components and complete ALM's.
o Ensuring that there is mission planning, facility
requirements development, budgeting, funding and the
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utilization of personnel, funds, materials, aund
facilities. [Ref. l:pp. 1-1-2]
3. Naval Sea Systems Conimand (NAVSEA)
NAVSEA is responsible to insure that adequate
intermediate maintenance facilities are available to
accomplish programs under the tasking and direction of
NAVAIR. On the Pacific Coast, NAVSEA field activities
(WEPSTA Concord and Seal Beach) perform the following
functions for NAVAIR in support of NAVAIR in support of the
NAWMP (Naval Airborne Weapons Maintenance Program):
o Receive, inspect, segregate, store, euid issue/ship
airborne weapons in their assigned missions and tasks,
o Maintain and rework airborne weapons in accordemce with
the tasking and direction of NAVAIR.
o Explosive load, modify, dissemble, assemble and perform
tests on airborne weapons,
o Perform quality assurance on airborne weapons and
calibration of NAVAIR test equipment,
o Report maintenance data via the Applicable MDCS.
o Meike transaction item reporting (TIR) and serial lot
item tracking (SLT) to the Conventional Ammunition
Integrated Management System (CAIMS).
o Exercise general supervision of the explosive safety
program. [Ref. l:pp. 1-1-4]
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4. Type Commander ( TYCOM)
On the Pacific coast. Commander Naval Air Forces,
Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) under the fleet commander
(CINCPACFLT), and Chief of Naval Reserve (CNAVRES), are
responsible for the organizational mainteneuice of airborne
weapons assigned them for the operation and support of
their naval missions. Specific functions by maintenance
level are detailed to subordinate commands. COMNAVAIRPAC is
responsible for local coordination of maintenance performed
by squadrons/units under their control to ensure effective
and economical use of assigned personnel, material,
equipment, emd facilities.
5. Naval Matfazines (NAVMAG)
The NAVMAGs are fleet activities whose
responsibilities include weapon receipt, storage, and
issue. They are located at: Subic Bay, RP; Seal Beach, CA;
Concord, CA; Guam, Mariana; Lualuale, HI.
6. Pacific Missile Test Center (PACMISTESTCEN)
The Pacific Missile Test Center is assigned as the
cognizeint maintenance engineering activity for ALMs and is
responsible for maintenance management functions such as
workload coordination: planning, monitoring, and execution,
inventory coordination, and prograim support activities.
PACMISTESTCEN responsibilities are implemented within its
own command structure and through the employment of
detachments at the weapon stations.
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7. Mobile Maintenance Unit-One (MMU-1)
MMU-1 is located at Cubi Point, The Republic of the
Philippines. They perform intermediate level maintenance on
air launched missiles. They are not within the NAVSEA
claimeuicy like the other I-level activities. Rather, they
work for CINCPACFLT under the direction of COMNAVAIRPAC.
Their workforce is composed of U.S. Navy sailors and
Philippine nationals. There are two PMTC representatives
there to keep the test equipment operational, to do pre-
sentencing work for returning carriers and ammunition
ships, eu:id to provide training and technical assistance.
8. Naval Weapon Station (WEPSTA)
The Naval Weapon Stations are responsible for
performing I-level maintenance on ALM's. They are set up as
NAVSEA controlled Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) activities.
The NIF is a revolving fund used to finance conmiercial or
industrial type Naval activities, such as WEPSTAs. Major
charges to the fund are civilian labor, material purchases,
travel, transport of material, auid contract services. The
fund is reimbursed through the sale of materials euid
services performed for the contracting activity. The
customer is charged for all labor performed and the
materials procured through this account. [Ref. 2: pp. 1-18]
They are not true NIF activities in that a p>ure NIF
activity will bid on a job and their cost will not change
throughout the year. Any profit or loss was kept by that
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activity. In this case, if there is a shortage NAVSEA can
go back to NAVAIR and request additional funds. The reverse
is also true, if there is a profit NAVSEA will refund a
portion of the excess to NAVAIR. The Weapons Stations
within the Pacific Fleet are Concord, CA, Seal Beach, CA.
9. Weapons Quality Engineering Center
The WQECs are departments within the WEPSTAs, Naval
Weapon Support Center, and Naval Ordnance Station. They are
responsible for monitoring the quality of maintenance and
failure analysis. This provides an assessment of weapons
and component stockpiles readiness.
10. Metrology Engineering Center
The Metrology Engineering Center, Naval Weapons
Station Seal Beach, Pomona Annex is responsible for the
developing, reviewing, and approving calibration for Test
Equipment. They are also responsible for assigning ond
maintaining calibration intervals to ensure currency.
B. THE SPARROW MISSILE
1. Sparrow
According to Jane's WEAPON SYSTEMS. "Sparrow is a
medium-range, all weather, all-aspect, semi-active guided
missile that is compatible with both Continuous Wave 2uid
pulse Doppler illuminations." [Ref. 3:pp. 760] In
addition to the air launched variety used in this study,
there is also a surface launched version, RIM (series). The
current production model is the fifth in a series.
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The missile has a cylindrical body 8 inches in
diameter and approximately 12 feet in length, with a
wingspan of 40 inches. It weighs approximately 510 pounds.
The missile consists of three major sections: guidance and
control, warhead, auid rocket motor. The AIM-7E versions
(Figure 1) has a target seeker group and flight control
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Figure 1
SPARROW AIM-7E
The AIM-7F/M version (Figure 2) is different. It has a
target seeker group and a flight control group which are
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physically separated by the warhead. [Ref. 4: pp. 3-1]







While the missile will be referred to as an ALL Up
Round, in reality it is not. For, by definition, a AUR
needs no assembly while the air version of the Sparrow
requires the addition a its wings. There are four movable
wings attached to the flight control group to provide for
missile flight path control in pitch, roll, and yaw planes.
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There are four stationary wings attached to the rocket
motor to provide stability during flight.
The RIM series (surface launched version) is
exteriorly different in that it has folding wings forward









Under the All Up Round concept, shipboard and NAS
organizational maintenance functions are kept to a minimum.
The objectives of .the ALM program are to provide to the
operating forces with their required allowance of ready-
for-issue (RFI) all-up-round (AUR) missiles, often
called a wooden round, to meet the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Asset Readiness Objectives (ARO) for
operational and war reserve stocks, to improve ALM
operational capabilities while at the same time
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reducing the maintenance burden, and to achieve this
effectiveness in the most efficient and cost effective
manner. [Ref. 2: pp. 1-1]
The missile maintenance program begins with the
procurement of the missile from a vendor, assembly at the





Upon NAVAIR acquisition of AUR's and ALM sections
from the vendor, the AUR' s/sections are shipped to a
designated WEPSTA for testing and or assembly. Sections
successfully meeting test requirements are available for
assembly into a AUR. Upon completion of assembly, the AUR
is stored until needed or is issued to the fleet.
2. Fleet Issue
AURs are provided to the carriers from the weapon
stations RFI stocks. The missiles are generally loaded on
board a service force ship amd transported to the carrier
where they transferred during Underway Replenishment
(UNREP) and stored in magazines in their AUR containers.
During a deployment, the carrier only unpacks a small
percentage of missiles, depending on the current threat or
training exercises.
The fleet is responsible ensuring the maximum use
of each missiles Serviceable In Service Time (SIST). This
is more difficult than it seems since the missiles are
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stored in a magazine with no way to access a container in
the back for issue without moving every container in the
magazine.
During a deployment, the ship should keep as many
missiles as possible in deep stowage, in their containers
seal unbroken, withdrawing only those necessary to meet
operational commitments.
Deep stowage assets are missiles or components
stored in environmentally protected containers since their
last WEPSTA processing. Only those missile that have
remained in deep stowage are normally eligible for cross-
decking. Once a missile has been taken out of its container
or the lead seals broken the receiving ships Ordnance
Officer will normally refuse to accept it. Unless, of
course, operational necessity requires otherwise.
A missile that is loaded onto sui aircraft and flown
without being fired is considered to have been captive
carried. Missiles that are captive flown require more
maintenance than those missiles that have remained in deep
stowage. Their internal components have been energized and
the acceleration/deceleration involved in launch and
recovery of the aircraft places a great deal of stress on
the components. Due to the inherent wear received by the
missile in loading, unloading, and flying through bad
weather, a missile may not look fine yet be fully
functional. Pilots used to request another missile, a new
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"better looking" one. Recent direction by the fleet
commander require that once captive flown, a missile should
be continued to be used in that capacity until a failure is
detected.
Redistribution is usually accomplished via cross-
decking procedures. By cross-decking, the cargo of one ship
is transferred to another ship. Cross-decking is repeated
throughout the SIST period whenever practicable until it
becomes necessary to return the missiles to Continental
United States (CONUS) in accordance with Maintenance Due
Date (MDD) requirements. The cross-decking of serviceable
missiles contributes to the asset reeuiiness.
3. Maintenance Pipeline
Fleet return missiles enter the pipeline by either
passing their MDD, exceeding their allowable captive flight
hours, or being damaged. Sixty days prior to completion of
a deployment, a presentencing team is sent to the Aircraft
Carrier (CV) to determine the exact status of the missiles.
The team is composed of technicians from PMTC. The missile
are inspected euid broken into two categories, those to be
cross-decked to another CV or Ammunition/Fast Combat Stores
Ship (AE/AOE), or transferred to the weapon station. Upon
arrival at the weapon .station, the missiles are stored in
bunkers or railroad flat cars until they are scheduled for
the production floor. The missile is taken out of its
container, inspected, tested and if without fault, repacked
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with a new MDD. If the missile fails, the faulty section is
identified and replaced.
A missile could "fail" while on deployment in the
Indian Ocean, be trsmsported by ship, transferred to a
WEPSTA and finally inspected. During the inspection, it
could be determined that the missile needed no maintenance
at all, merely that it needed to be inspected to have its
MDD updated.
Based on historical and predicted failure rates the
WEPSTA is able to forecast failure rates. This allows them
to budget and order spare parts accordingly. Table 1 is an
excerpt showing predicted failure and auiticipated jobs
required for FY88.
The time required to do the actual test on a
missile is 60 minutes for an AIM-7M, 70 minutes for an AIM-
7E, and approximately 80 minutes for an AIM-7F [Ref. 5].
The most critical component is the Guidance aund
Control sections. If that part fails and is in need of
repair, the section is shipped from WEPSTA Concord to Naval
Supply Center (NSC) Oakland. The parts remain there until
Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) Alameda has the availability
to begin work on Sparrow G&Cs. Upon being reworked, the
G&Cs are returned to NSC Oaklsuid. If Concord is in need of
a new G&C, they must requisition a G&C (new or reworked)
from NSC Oakland
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Assets on hand in the maintenance pipeline include
both All Up Rounds and individual components comprising the
AUR.
TABLE 1
AIM-7F OCCURRENCE FACTORS FOR FY 88
Job Description Occurrence Factor
AUR Inspection and Test 1.00
AUR Retest . 22
AUR Disassembly .33.
AUR Container Replacement . 17
G&C Replacement . 22
Warhead Replacement .03
Warhead WQEC X-RAY .01
Rocket Motor Replacement .08
Rocket Motor WQEC X-RAY .01
AUR Assembly .33
Essentially, unt^l AUR assembly occurs, the
maintenance pipeline consists primarily of individual
missile system components. Components in an unserviceable
condition constitute the maintenance backlog at each
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Intermediate Level Activity (IMA) and Designated Overhaul
Point (DOP).
D. MAINTENANCE LEVELS
1 . Ortfanizational Level Maintenance
Organizational maintenance consists of those
functions normally performed by the operating units on a
day-to-day basis in support of their own operations. This
maintenance is normally performed by weapons personnel
assigned to the maintenance department of a naval station
or squadron. The only missile testing done at the
orgeuiizational level utilizes the test equipment built into
the aircraft. While on the ground, the aircrew is unable to
tell if the missile is fully operational. They must be
airborne, with the radar energized to determine if the
seeker head is functional. The 0-level Maintenance consists
of:
o Inspect AUR containers/ cradles, stow.
o Inspect, stow external parts.
o Clean missile and external parts as required.
o Retorque body joint clamps as required.
o Install /remove wings/fins/external parts.
o Load/download missile on/from aircraft.
«
o Perform missile on aircraft test(s) and built in
test(s) as required,
o Perform missile preflight /postflight inspection.
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o Replace in container.
o Containers/cradles—Desiccan-b replacement only.
[Ref. l:pp 3-1-3]
2 . Intermediate Level Maintenance
I-level maintenance is the responsibility of, and
performed by WEPSTA and MMU. This level of maintenance
consists of testing AUR and section replacement. In
addition the I-level is responsible for:
o G&C/MGS- Inspect, test, section removal/replacement,
external auid selected internal components replacement
only,
o Rocket Motor/Sustainer. Inspect, test, replace.
Selected igniter replacement authorized,
o Warhead/S&A Device-Inspect, replace certain
components only,
o Electronic firing switch, Fuses/Target Detonation
Device (TDD)— Inspect, test, replace,
o Wings and Fins—Inspect, repair, replace only.
o Containers/Cradles—Minor part replacement, repair,
clean,
o Selected IMA's are authorized ALM assembly or
disassembly,
o AUR inspection and test,
o Remove AUR and reinstall into container.
[Ref. l:pp. 3-1-3]
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The missile is teiken out of its container with a
sling and put into a moveable cradle. The missile is then
immediately hooked to a missile ground. A missile ground is
similar to an electrical ground but it is another system,
suspended from the ceiling. A missile must always be hooked
to it except when they are in trauisit within the building.
The missile is first visually inspected, then taken to a
test cell. After being hooked up, the cell is evacuated and
the heavy door shut. The missile test is run from another
room with the progress monitored by the computer operated
test equipment. The missile can be observed by a stationary
camera to ensure that no wires have come loose. After
successful completion, the missile is removed from the
cell, cleaned up, and put into a container.
The I-level maintenance for the rocket motors in
Concord consists of visual inspections, cosmetic repairs,
and a check of the igniter circuit.
The I-level maintenance of the warhead consists of
a visual inspection. If damage is suspected, the warhead
can be transported to the WQEC building and X-rayed.
3. Depot Level Maintenamce
Depot level maintenance is performed on airborne
weapon sections, not on AURs. It include the overhaul and
complete rebuilding of assemblies, subassemblies, emd end
user parts. They support the other mainteneuice activities
by providing repaired parts euid technical expertise.
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Depot level maintenance of each missile combined will
normally be limited to repairs where the cost of labor
does not exceed 66% of new procurement costs. This
percentage factor does not apply to items that are
considered critical or in the best interest of the
government. [Ref. l:pp. 3-4-1].
They are also responsible for the maintenance of
the test equipment used at the I-level. D-level work
consists of:
o G&C/MGS— Inspect, test, repair, rework, modify to
assembly/subassembly/component level. Reassemble,
perform final system test.
o Rocket motor/Igniter/Gas Generators- Repair, rework,
regrain, replace, modify.
o Warhead/S&A Device/Electronic firing Switch—Repair,
rework, replace, modify.
o Fuze/TDD-Repair, rework, modify.
o Ordnance Section /Fuze Components- Repair, rework,
modify.
o Wings cmd Fins—Repair, rework, modify.
o Rear Antenna—Repair.
o Container/Cradles—Major repairs. [Ref. l:pp 3-1-3]
Naval Aviation Depot is located at HAS Alameda.
They perform D-level maintenance on Phoenix, Shrike, and
Sparrow missiles. They are the only facility to perform
this mainteneuice. The building was built in 1972 and
contains 80,000 square feet, with the east wall designed to
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maintenance for Air Force missiles, including the D-level
work for their fins and wings. They presently have seven
AN/DPM-22 missile test set, miscelleuieous hydraulic test
equipment for AIM-7E and AIM-7F, pneumatic test equipment
for AIM-7M, paint booths, aui aneochic testing chamber and a
stripping facility. According to the plant superintendent
the are capable of doing 96% of all work within the
building. The remaining work, bead blasting and special
stripping, is done in a nearby building. They even have the
capability to do polyurethane painting. The employees are
predominantly WG- 11/12, consisting of two trades. Ordnance
Equipment Mechanic and Electronics Mechanic. [Ref . 6]
The facility may be impressive but what is even
more impressive is the impression one gets while walking
through the production floor. It is apparent that the
workers take pride in their work and have a dedication to
the task at hand. This is not production line work with the
workers performing the same task each time. Every missile
component has its own problems and it is a challenge to
trouble shoot and repair them. The management of NADEP
Alaoneda should be commended for retaining their employees
when they could make more money working in Sunnyvale for an
electronics company. ,
The NADEP used to have a 4 year apprenticeship
program that would bring someone with no training into the
program and prepare them for an entry level position at
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NADEP, a WG-8 position. After obtaining an entry level
position, it takes a worker five years to reach WG-11, and
if able to perform well enough reach WQ-12 in three or four
additional years. The average time working at NADEP is
sixteen years.
The following is a summary breakdown of maintenance
performed at each activity.
E. TEST EQUIPMENT
The heart of any maintenance progreun is its test
equipment. Unless your equipment is accurate, you are
subject to false accepts/rejects. The result of a false
accept could be the loss of aircrews. The I-level tests,
particularly the AN/DPM-156 is only capable of testing a
Go, No-Go situation. They only know if the missile is
capable of being launched and the rocket motor firing, not
if the missile is capable of operating at the edges of its
envelope.
1. AN/DPM-21
The AN/DPM-21 is the test set used by WEPSTA to
perform I-level tests. After being hooked up and the test
sequence initiated by the operator, the missile is
automatically tested using a built in microcomputer module.
The test will continue until completion or a fault is
discovered. The operator then can either reset the test to
continue or stop the test. If the operator does nothing,
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the machine will automatically resume testing after two
minutes. Upon completion of the test, a Go or No-Go
indication will be given. A printer provides a hardcopy for
the record. The missile is provided operational stimuli by
generated electrical and Radio Frequency inputs to the
target seeker and flight control group. The missile
responds by routing test results to the test set. The
results are compared with specified parameters. The
missile test is automatically monitored in an adjacent
room by test personnel. Replacement cost would be
approximately 7.5 million dollars. The test equipment is
hard to maintain and spare parts are virtually non-
existent.
2 . AN/DSM-156 Guided Missile Test Set
The AN/DSM-156 is used to perform intermediate
level operational tests on Sparrow Missiles. The unit can
be broken down into three transportable shipping cases,
which when combined with a Guided Missile Cradle is all
that is necessary to perform the test. The AN/DSM-156 is a
variant of the Air Force AN/DSM-151 Test Set. The major
difference being that the Navy version is designed to be
operated from a remote location. This allows the missile to
be tested as em AUR. The Air Force Version must be
disassembled prior to test.
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Figure 4
AN/DPM-21 Guided Missile Test Set
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AN/DSM-156 Guided Missile Test Set
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The AN/DSM-156 can be housed in two separate
vans to form a Mobile Missile Maintenance Facility. In May
1982, such a unit was set up in Subic Bay, Republic of the
Philippines. It is operated by Mobile Maintenance Unit-One.
The unit is composed of active duty sailors and Filipino
Nationals. There are also two PACMISTESTCEN employees who
are responsible for maintaining the test equipment.
3. ANZD£M:zaaA-Suiciea Missi le Test Set
The AN/DPM-22A test set is used by NADEP
Aleoneda to perform D-level tests on Sparrow missiles. The
set has three different configurations; target seeker
group, flight control group, and Missile Guidance Set
(MGS). It is more diagnostic in nature thsui the AN/DPM-21
and is capable of isolating a fault down to the work
replaceable assembly. The AN/DPM-21 is computer controlled
to do all test routines as well as doing a logic ginalysis
of the test results to automatically isolate the highest
failure rate item, which guides in isolating the more
difficult repairs.
Currently NADEP Alameda has seven test sets to
do D-level maintenance on AIM-7E/F, with six additional
sets to be installed to test AIM-7M.
F. MAINTENANCE COSTS •
The cost for performing Sparrow maintenance is
straightforward. The WEPSTA is given an estimate of the
number of missiles to be processed for that year. By using
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AN/DPM-22A Guided Missile Test Set
Figure 6
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the occurrence factors, shown earlier, the can predict the
amount of work by category. They then use the Industrial
Processing Guide to determine the number of direct labor
hour necessary to perform those tasks. Then multiplying
those figures by their standard labor rate they come up
with totals for the year. These bids are then sent to and
reviewed by PMTC.
TABLE 3
AIM-7F MAINTENANCE COSTS FOR FY 88
TASK DESCRIPTION COST in $
I -LEVEL MAINTENANCE 940
AUR to RFI
COMPONENT COST
Missile Sentencing Inspection 72
AUR Disassembly 203
Warhead Repair 185
Rocket Motor Repair 400
Wing and Fin Set 179
D-LEVEL
Guidance & Control Repair 9,995
Costs are broken down by either performing the simple
inspection, AUR to RFI, or the cost to perform a specific
task. The WEPSTA is paid only for completed units whereas





Estimating ALM throughput capability is influenced by a
number of variables such as meunpower levels, skill mix, new
production/Fleet return workload planning, test cell and
test equipment availability and certification, support
equipment availability, personnel training, asset and
material availability, storage capability, and facility
constraints [Ref. 7: pp. 4]. In some facilities there is
the additional constraint of the type and total quantity of
missiles that are being worked on.
TABLE 4
WEPSTA CONCORD SPARROW CAPACITY
FLEET RETURN NEW PRODUCTION
TWO TEST CELLS 1500 3000
THREE TEST CELLS 2250 4500
The quantities listed below are for the estimated
number of missiles to be processed annually by WEPSTA
Concord working one eight hour shift, five dsiys a week.
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The throughput quantity is the maximum simount of
missiles that could be processed if that was the only-
missile to be worked on. New production capability is based
on 12 missiles per day. Fleet Return quantity is based on
completion of six AUR to RFI missiles per day.
TABLE 5








FY 88 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92
187 210 144 137 78
278 733 991 1220 12342
844 660 349























TOTAL 1807 2052 1894 1732 1598
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At present WEPSTA Concord has only two test sets. A
third test set is being transferred from the Fallbrook
Annex and should be operational by the beginning of the
fourth quarter FY88.
The original thrust of this thesis was to show that the
Navy could decrease turnaround time and become more cost
effective by combining intermediate and depot level
maintenance into a single site. An analysis of the actual
maintenance process shows that this is not feasible. What
will follow are the reasons for that conclusion, and what
the next best choice is.
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY FOR WEPSTA CONCORD
IN USE BY FY
AVERAGE
FY 88 FY 89 FY90 FY 91 FY92
62.9 73.9 75.0 76.9 71.0
As was shown in the data section, there is an average
175 day turn around time for the critical part of G&C. By
knowing this amount, the planners figure on the amount of
missiles needed in the total inventory to support current
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needs and still have missiles tied up in the maintenance
pipeline. This is all taken into account when developing
the Logistics Support Plan. Given the current 175 day turn
around, that would mean that a missile would have a maximum
of 63% Asset Readiness (AR). This means if they need 6,300
missiles available, they must procure 10,000 missiles.
Realizing this, the Navy was faced with a problem, how to
decrease the delay time associated with G&C repair.
Otherwise, missiles would be tied up in Concord awaiting
the G&C to be repaired in Alameda. The reason the Navy
could not just go out and purchase more G&C only is that
since it is considered the critical part, for every G&C the
Navy purchased it was considered to have bought an
additional missile. After receiving permission from SECNAV,
the Navy was able to establish a rotatable pool of spares
that would not count against their AR. This resulted in a
dramatic increase in maximum AR since the critical time is
now the time it takes to perform intermediate level
maintenance at Concord. The new maximum theoretical AR is
92% given a 25 day turnaround in maintenance.
Since Concord averaged a 26 day turnaround instead of
the 25 dso^ standard, this has a direct impact in the total
number of missiles available, basically a total of 28
missiles in the total inventory per day.
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Requirements to do D-level maintencuice for Navy Sparrow
missiles has been estimated at 4,000 sq ft auid 15 people
[Ref. 5]. However, this would not include the maintenance
of the skins or hydraulics/pneumatics. In order to do all
Sparrow work, including Air Force/FMS birds an activity in
Concord would need a 20,000 square feet building and a
staff of 40 people. Since the experienced people presently
work in Aleuneda, treuisfer costs would have to be figured
in. The cost is insignif iceuit since the distance is only 35
miles. The equipment as well as the people to operate this
specialized equipment would have to be transferred. Since
G&C are no longer a limiting factor, there is no reason for
the D-Level activity to be moved. If they were, the
following points need to be considered.
1
.
The cost in AR due to the stoppage of maintensuice
while tearing out test equipment, packaging and
installing the equipment at Concord.
2. Time must be allowed for troubleshooting au:id
calibrating the equipment after the move.
B. FACILITIES AT NAVAL WEAPON STATION CONCORD
1. Building 87
Intermediate level repairs are being conducted in
Building 87 (Figure 7). The building was built in 1959. It
is a one story concrete building enclosing 22,703 square
feet. The building is broken into two sections; the A
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section is used to conduct the mainteneuice of the AUR'
while the B section is used as storage and uncrating of
sections. The actual test cell have eight foot thick walls
and blast door to relieve pressure in the event of an
explosion,
2 . Building 97
Presently, intermediate level repair for Sparrow
rocket motors and warheads is being done in Building 97
WEPSTA Concord. The building is a one story, steel freime
building with 13,832 square feet. It is considered
substandard, but functionally adequate.
Substandard describes a facility with modification or
repair deficiencies that normal require approval and
funding beyond the authority of the activity commanding
officer to make the facility adequate for its function.
[Ref. 7:pp. 16]
The building is programmed under MILCON project P-271
in FY 90 to upgrade the building to accept STANDARD and
TOMAHAWK work.
C. TIME STANDARDS
The CNO has developed standard times it should take for
different phases of the maintenance cycle. These standards
are a result of the Weapon System Planning Document, Fleet
Analysis Center Performance Monitoring System, and
experience with earlier SPARROW versions. These figures do
not take into account the time a missile is in tremsit to
CONUS.
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The Asset Readiness is determined by the number of
missiles in a All Up Round (AUR) status divided by the
total number of missiles in the inventory, or the asset
objective, whichever is lower. The Asset Readiness
Objective is the goal to be achieved/maintained in asset
readiness percentage. An improvement in Asset Readiness is
achieved by ensuring that adequate quantities of
unserviceable weapons in the maintenance pipeline are
converted to a serviceable condition.
By decreasing the number of days to process, the
missiles will yield a higher ARO as well as decrease the
total amount of missiles needed in the inventory.
TABLE 7
MAINTENANCE DELAY STANDARDS
ELEMENT STD DAYS AVERAGE
AWAITING TEST/INDUCTION




TRANSIT TIME/AWAITING DOP INDUCTION
TIME IN MAINTENANCE
AWAITING TRANSIT/TRANSIT TO NWS











The above figures were derived from data for the first
six months of 1985.
The SPARROW maintenance time clock begins when the
missiles, in their containers, arrive at the pier. If they
are in any other port but Concord, they must first be
shipped to Concord via rail or truck. Once at Concord, they
are stored in rail cars or magazines until they are taJiCen
to Building 87.
The Navy was hiring to peo'^roll but this program has
been overridden by a hiring freeze. The addition of more
people could solve their backlog problem. To solve their
problem, they can use flex hour to alleviate the problem.
The other solution is to hire/start a second shift. This
will give you more access to the test equipment.
D. MISSILE AVAILABILITY
The amount of time a missile is available is a function
of its maintenance time and the time it is available for
fleet use. By using this information the amount of missiles
to be procured to meet the threat cfiui be determined. For
example, if a missile is available for use 84% of the time
and 840 missiles were needed to hsundle current needs, a
total of 1,000 missiles would be needed. Given that the
«
SIST for SPARROW missiles is 300 days it is easy to see
that the Navy dramatically changed the missile availability
by developing the rotatable pool of G&C. They chauiged the
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turn around time for the missile from 175 days to 25 days.
Turn around time is the time it tsJces for a missile to
enter the maintenance pipeline and return, to am operational
status. This time includes transportation, maintenance, and
time waiting to do the next event.
SIST
Missile Availability =
Turn around time + SIST
300
Old Missile Availability= = 63. 16X
175 + 300
300
New Missile Availability = = 92.31%
25 + 300
If you were to take one day out of the maintenance
cycle. Potential availability for the missile will
increase.
300
Potential Missile Availability = —^—_ = 92.59%
24 + 300
Assuming that 9,231 missile were needed to handle
current operational requirements, 10,000 missiles will need
to be procured. Taking 1 day out of the maintenance cycle
will make 9,259 missiles available on any given day. So,
instead of increasing asset readiness it is possible to
procure less missiles fimd have the same readiness that
there was before the change.
50
92.31% of 10,000 missiles = 9,231 missiles
92.59% of 10,000 missiles = 9,259 missiles
9,259 - 9,231 = 28 missiles
Potential Procurement Cost Saving
28 missiles ® $192,500 = $5,390,000
A cost savings in procurement costs of $5,390,000 can
be realized if one day was cut in the maintensmce cycle,
provided the cost of that saving was free. A list of
alternatives can be developed, such as, hire more
personnel, pay overtime, purchase more test equipment. Then
the cost of these alternatives ceun be compared to the
savings realized by cutting the maintenance time. Those
alternatives the cost less to implement than the price of
one day of maintenance need to be explored.
E. MISSILE CONTAINERS
#
The other problem is that of containers. They are
designed to carry three AIM-7 missiles, less fins. They are
designed to be waterproof but not airtight. This results in
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humidi-by being trapped inside when it is first packaged suid
while it is in storage. As the container goes from a warm
environment to a colder one, water condenses inside the
container. This causes the attached humidity indicator to
change colors, indicating excessive moisture, a problem
serious enough to require that enclosed missiles be
inspected. The 0- level activity has no way of checking if
the container failed or the missiles did.
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IV. SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Maintensmce is performed for one of two reasons, either
preventative or corrective. The Navy performs preventative
maintenance by checking the missile every thirty months to
ensure it is still operational. Corrective maintenance is
also performed to correct damage or replace a failed part.
For most equipment it is simple to find out if it works,
simply turn it on. Unfortunately, the only sure way to find
out if a missile works is to fire it. Since this is not
possible, the present maintenance program has been made. It
works. They have in excess of a 94% sucess rate with live
firing. It is easy to say increase the MDD to achieve cost
savings but this would be foolish if it impacts readiness.
This thesis has shown how SPARROW missile maintenance
is organized, performed, and the costs involved. The key to
the maintenance pipeline is the capacity of the WEPSTA to
process missiles.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The maintenance program for SPARROW missiles works. The
proposal to combine depot and intermediate level into a
single site is without merit. To do this would require
duplicating the work presently being done at one site at
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the other. This should not be done. If the work currently-
being done in Concord were to be shifted to Alameda, the
explosive limits for the base will be exceeded. This is
because the missile must be fully armed during an I-level
test with an AN/DPM-21.
The other alternative is to build a D-level facility at
Concord. If you wanted to do Navy missiles, that would mean
duplicating work that is done only 25 miles aweiy. If you
wanted to build a facility to do all missiles, including
Air Force missiles, the costs are substantial. But there
would be no benefit that would be realized. This is because
the rotatable pool of G&C sections takes the time element
of repair of G&C out of the picture. There is inefficiency
in the way G&C are trauisferred back and forth from Alauneda
and Concord, but it has no impact on G&C availability.
Since combining the two activities is not a realistic
alternative, procedures to decrease the aonount of time
needed to do maintenaurice at the Weapon Station need to be
found. In the following section, three alternatives will be
discussed.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
As was shown in the Analysis Chapter, the cost
f
avoidance for decreasing one day of maintenauice is
$5,390,000. To accomplish this you must make the system
more efficient. Prior to the establishment of the rotatable
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pool for G&C, the most critical factor was the turnaround
time for the G&C. This meant that the best ARO you could
hope for was 63%. With the establishment of the pool, this
number improved to 92%. This does not include the time the
missiles are in transit to CONUS. At present there are
three main factors slowing down turnaround time. They are
missile containers, number of personnel, and test
equipment. Each item will be discussed separately.
The weapon station had, on 1 December 1987, enough
parts to assemble 600 missiles, yet only the containers for
150. The problems with the containers seem chronic, yet no
action has been taken. Either new containers need to be
developed or the storage/packing of the containers will
have to be kept in a controlled environment. The problem
must be given precedence in order for the SPARROW program
to remain successful.
WEPSTA Concord ability to hauidle missiles is reaching
it capacity. It is not possible to simply add people in an
attempt to handle the workload. The working area has limits
as to the maximum number of people allowed on the
production floor at any single time. The amount of missiles
that can be processed is limited by the number of test sets
euid not the number of .people. Possible solutions are to go
to flexible hours or a small second shift. This would allow
for more missiles to have access to the test set than would
be possible in a regular eight hour shift.
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The third test set must be installed ajid made
operational. The time to complete a test for a single
missile is approximately one hour if everything goes well.
However, if a fault is detected, or problems develop, this
could cause a missile to be tested a number of times before
passing inspection. Combine this with a single shift the
amount of missiles that can be processed each day remains
small.
The following recommendations will not increase Asset
Readiness but are worthy of mention.
Develop a procedure to notify the entire missile
mainteneince pipeline of changes in the workload schedules.
This could best be accomplished by the presentencing team
which only notifies PMTC and NAVAIR of the missiles that
need maintenance. No similar notice is given to NAVSEA
which has to schedule the actual maintenauice. Nor is
notification given to the NADEP in Alameda on how many G&C
to expect and when. Due to the high degree of confidence in
what repairs will be required, everyone could benefit from
this advance knowledge aind could plaui accordingly.
A contingency plan to test SPARROW missiles in forward
areas needs to be developed. Since it is considered too
hazardous to test the 'missiles aboard ship, a mobile self
contained test facility is needed. It is recommended that a
second set of vans similar to the one used by MMU-1 be
procured and wherever there is a high operating environment
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that the vans be forward deployed. This would allow the
fleet to have expired missiles returned almost immediately.
If spare G&C sections were also sent this would allow for
an even quicker reissue.
Allow NAD Alameda to mix Guidance sections and Control
sections. Presently they must keep the two sections as a
matched pair. This would allow for a quicker turnaround
time, since only one of the sections may be awaiting a
part, or in need of specific repairs.
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